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Abstract Informationallyrobustequilibria(IRE)areintroducedinRobson(Games
Econ Behav 7:233–245, 1994) as a reﬁnement of Nash equilibria for strategic
games. Such equilibria are limits of a sequence of (subgame perfect) Nash equilib-
riainperturbedgameswherewithsmallprobabilityinformationaboutthestrategic
behavior is revealed to other players (information leakage). Focusing on bimatrix
games, we consider a type of informationally robust equilibria and derive a num-
ber of properties: they form a non-empty and closed subset of the Nash equilibria.
Moreover, IRE is a strict concept in the sense that the IRE are independent of
the exact sequence of probabilities with which information is leaked. The set of
IRE, like the set of Nash equilibria, is the ﬁnite union of polytopes. In potential
games, there is an IRE in pure strategies. In zero-sum games, the set of IRE has
a product structure and its elements can be computed efﬁciently by using linear
programming. We also discuss extensions to games with inﬁnite strategy spaces
and more than two players.
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1 Introduction
A branch of game-theoretic literature deals with reﬁnements of the Nash equi-
librium concept. Starting with the perfect equilibria of Selten (1975), and along
the way developing notions like properness (Myerson 1978) and strict perfectness
(Okada 1984), it eventually culminated in the work of (Kohlberg and Mertens
1986). See Van Damme (1991) for an overview. The original idea underlying these
concepts is that players undergo a thought experiment in which all players make
mistakes with small, but positive probabilities. The current paper uses a simi-
lar, but somewhat different thought experiment of the type suggested by Robson
(1994), where with small, positive probability one of the players’ action choices
is revealed. Such “information leakage” is of relevance in numerous practical sit-
uations, witnessing the literature on industrial espionage, creating ﬁrst- or second-
mover (dis)advantages (see, for instance, Bagwell 1995), enforcing cooperation
(Matsui 1989), but also – more casually – the importance of being able to hide the
strength of your hand in a poker game.
Throughout the paper, we consider mixed extensions of ﬁnite, two-person
games (bimatrix games). Games are perturbed by allocating small probabilities
to two disjoint events. With large probability, the original game is played, but there
is a small probability that the action choice of one of the players is revealed to the
other. Informally, there is a small probability that one of the players acts ﬁrst. If,
say,player1actsﬁrst,player2observesthedecisionofplayer1.Ifplayer1playsa
mixed strategy, player 2 is informed about the outcome of the chance mechanism.
Thereafter, he can base his decision on this information. Player 1 cannot distin-
guishbetweenthiscaseandtheregularone,i.e.,hedoesnotknowifheisrevealing
his action or not. Similarly, player 2 may act ﬁrst (not knowing this himself) and
player 1 can respond. The events player 1 acts ﬁrst and player 2 acts ﬁrst do not
necessarily have the same probability.
AnalternativewaytomodelleakageofinformationisgiveninRenyandRobson
(2004). Here, a player’s mixed strategy may be revealed and the corresponding
perturbed games are Bayesian. In particular, this allows for a reinterpretation of
a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium by means of Bayesian equilibria. Solan and
Yariv (2004) provide a two-player model in which player 1 can purchase (obtain
by espionage) a noisy signal of the chosen strategy of player 2.
Our approach, however, follows the lines set out by Robson (1994). Focussing
on bimatrix games, our underlying thought experiment allows for the possibility
of a player’s action to be revealed. Further, we put restrictions on the perturbations
in order to have perturbed games of the same dimension as the original one.
To highlight these differences and to get acquainted with the model, let us






The row player has no direct inﬂuence on his payoff by his own action. He can
however, have the following line of thought:
If there would be a slight chance that my opponent can act upon my action,
then I’d better play the top row; my opponent’s best reply to this action is
playing the left column. This leads to a beneﬁt of 1.IRE for bimatrix games 541
Fig. 1 A perturbation concerning leakage of information in extensive form
Letεi denotetheprobabilitythatplayeri’sactionisrevealedtotheotherplayer
(i ∈{ 1,2}). The extensive form of this perturbation is depicted in Figure 1. The
analysis of Robson takes place in this extensive form game, requiring subgame
perfection. Notice that there is an exponential growth in the size of strategy spaces
in the perturbed game; if the players in the bimatrix game have m, respectively n,
pure strategies, they have mn+1 and nm+1 pure strategies in the perturbed game.
Our paper contains an analysis of perturbed games in normal form and avoids the
exponential growth by putting a common rationality restriction on the behavior
of the players. These restrictions only have a bite in the one-person (like) perfect
information subgames at the end of the game tree. In a subgame perfect equilib-
rium,theplayerinvolvedchoosesanactionthatmaximizeshisutility.Toreducethe
strategy spaces of the perturbed games, we delete all other strategies beforehand.
Generically, all but one strategy in such subgames are omitted.
As a tie-breaking rule in non-generic cases, we assume that the player involved
chooses a utility maximizing action that maximizes the payoff to the other player
(“optimistic tie-breaking”).1
1 An alternative tie-breaking rule would be to choose a utility maximizing action that is worst
for the opponent (pessimistic tie-breaking). This would not affect the results of this paper. We
thank a referee for pointing out that the optimistic tie is superior for reasons of generalization.
For a discussion we refer to Section 7.542 H. Reijnierse et al.
Havingdeﬁnedtheperturbedgamesinthisway,astrategyproﬁleiscalledinfor-
mationally robust if it is the limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria of perturbed
games, with probabilities of information leakage converging to zero.
Ourmainresultsareasfollows.Informationallyrobustequilibriaaredeﬁnedin
Section 2. Furthermore, it provides an alternative way to describe informationally
robustness (Lemma 1) and shows that the set of informationally robust equilibria
isanon-empty,closedsubsetofthegame’sNashequilibria(Theorem1).Section3
provides a second characterization of IRE by showing that the exact sequence
of probabilities with which information leakage occurs is irrelevant (Theorem 2).
Theorem 3 in Section 4 characterizes the structure of the set of IRE: like the set
of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games it is the ﬁnite union of polytopes. Next, we
consider two special classes of games. In Section 5 it is shown that in potential
games(cf.MondererandShapley1996)thereisalwaysapure-strategyequilibrium
that is informationally robust (Theorem 4). In Section 6 it is shown that – again in
correspondence with the set of Nash equilibria, which is the Cartesian product of a
zero-sum game’s maximin/minimax strategies – the set of IRE in two-person zero-
sum games has a product structure, whose elements can be computed efﬁciently
using linear programming (Theorem 5). Section 7 concludes with a discussion of
the possibilities of generalizing our analysis to games with inﬁnite strategy spaces
and games with more than two players.
2 IRE
Let us ﬁx the notations that are used throughout the paper. A bimatrix game is the
mixed extension of a ﬁnite two-person noncooperative game. It is characterized by
ap a i r(A, B) of real-valued matrices of equal, ﬁnite, size. The players are called
1 and 2. Player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a column. We use m for the
number of rows and n for the number of columns. The index sets of the rows and
columns are denoted by M and N, respectively:
M ={ 1,...,m} and N ={ 1,...,n}.
Typical characters to index rows are i and k, typical characters to index columns
are j and  . The spaces of mixed strategies are called  m and  n, respectively.
Furthermore,   =  m ×  n; the space of strategy proﬁles. The unit vectors of
 m and  n (i.e., the pure strategies) are denoted by ei (i ∈ M) and f j (j ∈ N).
Atypicalelementof m willbedenotedby p,atypicalelementof n byq.Players
have a pure best reply correspondence:
PB 1(A,q) = argmax
i∈M
ei Aq and PB 2(B, p) = argmax
j∈N
pBfj.
These correspondences are upper semi-continuous in both coordinates, e.g., if
(At,qt) tends to (A,q),t h e nPB 1(At,qt) ⊆ PB 1(A,q) for sufﬁciently large t.
The carrier C(x) of a vector x is the set of its non-zero coordinates, i.e.,
C(x) ={ i | xi  = 0}.
A Nash equilibrium (p,q) is a proﬁle of mixed strategies such that C(p) ⊆
PB 1(A,q) and C(q) ⊆ PB 2(B, p). The set of all Nash equilibria of the gameIRE for bimatrix games 543
(A, B) is denoted by E(A, B). Two extra parameters are needed to give the per-
turbations of A and B. The probability that the action of player 1 is revealed to
player 2 is called ε1 > 0. The probability that the action of player 2 is revealed to
player 1 is called ε2 > 0. By assumption, ε1 + ε2 < 1. We deﬁne Aij(ε1,ε 2),t h e
payoff player 1 receives in a perturbed game when player 1 chooses strategy ei and
player 2 chooses f j, as follows. With large probability (1 − ε1 − ε2) he receives
the original payoff Aij. With probability ε1, ﬁrst player’s action ei is revealed to
player2,whocanrespondoptimallytoit,i.e.,chooseanelementof PB 2(B,ei).In
case of multiple best replies player 2 selects one of the strategies f  ∈ PB 2(B,ei)
that maximizes his opponent’s utility Ai . Conversely, with probability ε2, second
player’s action f j is revealed to player 1, who reacts optimally against it, resulting
in maxk∈M Akj. The perturbed game for player 2 is deﬁned analogously. This
leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 Let(A, B)beanm×n-bimatrixgameandlet(ε1,ε2)beapairofposi-
tiverealnumberssatisfyingε1+ε2 < 1.Theperturbedgame(A(ε1,ε 2), B(ε1,ε 2))
is the bimatrix game given by
Aij(ε1,ε 2) = (1 − ε1 − ε2)Aij + ε1 max{Ai , ∈ PB 2(B,ei)}+ε2 max
k∈M
Akj,
Bij(ε1,ε 2) = (1 − ε1 − ε2)Bij + ε1 max
 ∈N
Bi  + ε2 max{Bkj,k ∈ PB 1(A, f j)}.
Now we have made all preparations to deﬁne informationally robust equilibria.
Deﬁnition 2 Let (A, B) be an m × n-bimatrix game. A proﬁle (p,q) is an infor-
mationally robust equilibrium or IRE if there exist sequences (εt
1)t∈N and (εt
2)t∈N
of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence (pt,qt)t∈N in  






The set of informationally robust equilibria of (A, B) is denoted by IRE(A, B).
There is an alternative convenient characterization of IRE by means of best reply
equivalent perturbed games. Two bimatrix games (A, B) and (C, D) of equal size
are called best reply equivalent if their pure best reply functions coincide:
PB 1(A,·) = PB 1(C,·) and PB 2(B,·) = PB 2(D,·).
We will denote this type of equivalence by (A, B) ≡b (C, D).
Fix an m × n-bimatrix game (A, B).L e tR in Rm×n be deﬁned by
Rij = max{Ai  |   ∈ PB 2(B,ei)}.
So, rows of R are constant. Similarly, deﬁne S in Rm×n by
Sij = max{Bkj | ek ∈ PB 1(A, f j)}.
The alternative perturbations of A and B will be
A(ε1) = A + ε1R and B(ε2) = B + ε2S.544 H. Reijnierse et al.
Lemma 1 Let (A, B) be an m × n-bimatrix game. A proﬁle (p,q) is IRE if and
only if there exist sequences (εt
1)t∈N and (εt
2)t∈N of positive real numbers converg-





Proof Best reply equivalent games have identical equilibrium sets. Since the deﬁ-
nition of IRE concerns equilibrium sets of perturbed games, we might as well use
other perturbed games as long as they are best reply equivalent. It is easy to verify
that (A, B) and (tA,uB) are best reply equivalent for any positive real numbers t
and u,a n ds oa r e(A, B) and (A + T, B + U) if T is a matrix with constant col-
umns and U is a matrix with constant rows. Let (εt
1)t∈N and (εt
2)t∈N be sequences



































































2). Then one might as well
use the sequences ( t
1)t∈N and ( t
2)t∈N in combination with perturbed games of the
form (A +  t
1R, B +  t
2S).    





discussed in the Section 1. The game (A(ε1,ε 2), B(ε1,ε 2)) is given by

















(1,1)( ε 1,ε 1 + 2ε2)
(1 − ε1,2ε1 + ε2)( 0,2)
 
,
and the alternative perturbation (A + ε1R, B + ε2S) is
 
(1 + ε1,1 + ε2)( ε 1,2ε2)
(1,ε 2)( 0 ,2 + 2ε2)
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In both cases, the top row of the perturbed A-matrix strictly dominates its bottom
row. Hence, in an IRE, player 1 will play top. Player 2 can only respond optimally








Here, the proﬁle (bottom, right) is the unique IRE. Although it heavily relies on
the precise situations that are modelled by the two games, we have the opinion that
in this example IRE outperforms any Nash-reﬁnement that is invariant under best
reply equivalent manipulation.
Theorem 1 Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game. Then IRE(A, B) is a non-empty and
closed subset of E(A, B).
Proof Firstly, we show the non-emptyness. Let (εt
1)t∈N and (εt
2)t∈N be sequences




converging to, say, (p,q) ∈  , which is an element of IRE(A, B) by Deﬁnition 2
and Lemma 1.
To prove that (p,q) ∈ IRE(A, B) is a Nash equilibrium, we show thatC(p) ⊆
PB 1(A,q) and C(q) ⊆ PB 2(B, p). Obviously, it sufﬁces to prove the ﬁrst state-
ment. Take sequences (εt
1)t∈N and (εt
2)t∈N of positive numbers converging to 0
and proﬁles (pt,qt) in E(A(εt
1), B(εt
2)) converging to (p,q).L e ti ∈ C(p).T h e n




Taking t to inﬁnity, we ﬁnd for all k ∈ M:
ei Aq  ekAq.
Finally,weshowthatIRE(A, B)isclosed.Takeaconvergingsequence(pt,qt)t∈N
in IRE(A, B) with limit (p,q).F o re v e r yt, there are sequences (εtk
1 ,εtk
2 )k∈N con-







is in IRE(A, B).    
3 Strict IRE
Like Robson (1994), we allowed the probabilities of information leakage to be
different for the respective players. But requiring them to be equal does not affect
thesetofinformationallyrobustequilibria.Onecangoevenfurther:ifthereissome
sequence of perturbed games making some proﬁle an IRE, then any sequence of
perturbed games converging to the original game supports this proﬁle being an546 H. Reijnierse et al.
IRE. This section proves the above statement. Firstly, the notion of strict IRE is
deﬁned, analogously to the way Okada (1984) has reﬁned perfectness to strict
perfectness.
Deﬁnition 3 An equilibrium (p,q) of game (A, B) is called a strict IRE if for
all decreasing sequences (εt
1,εt
2)t∈N converging to (0,0) there is a sequence






Theorem 2 Foranybimatrixgame(A, B)thesetsof IRE andstrict IRE coincide.
Proof Obviously, every strict IRE is an IRE. Conversely, let (p,q) ∈ IRE(A, B)
with – see Lemma 1 – associated sequences
(δt
1,δt
2) −→ (0,0) and (pt,qt) −→ (p,q)
and (pt,qt) ∈ E(A(δt
1), B(δt
2)) for all t ∈ N. Using subsequences if necessary,
we can assume that C(p) ⊆ C(pt) = C(pt 
) and C(q) ⊆ C(qt) = C(qt 
) for all




that this sequence of perturbations supports (p,q) as an IRE, we ﬁnd a T ∈ N and
a sequence ( ˆ pt, ˆ qt)tT converging to (p,q) with ( ˆ pt, ˆ qt) ∈ E(A(εt
1), B(εt
2)) for
















Indeed, for i = 1,2, the ﬁrst inequality δ1
i >ε t
i is automatically fulﬁlled, since
δ1
i >ε T
i and the sequence (εt
1,εt
2)t∈N is decreasing. Hence, there are unique
λ(t),μ(t) ∈ (0,1) with
εt
1 = λ(t)δ1




2 + (1 − μ(t))δ
k(t)
2 .
Deﬁne the proﬁle ( ˆ pt, ˆ qt) by
ˆ pt = μ(t)p1 + (1 − μ(t))pk(t) and ˆ qt = λ(t)q1 + (1 − λ(t))qk(t).
Since (εt
1,εt
2) −→ (0,0) and (δt
1,δt
2) −→ (0,0), it follows that ( ˆ pt, ˆ qt) −→
(p,q). It remains to show that ( ˆ pt, ˆ qt) ∈ E(A(εt
1), B(εt
2)) for all t  T.S ol e t
t  T. Because of the similarity, we only show that C( ˆ pt) ⊆ PB 1(A(εt
1), ˆ qt).
Take i ∈ C( ˆ pt). Because C( ˆ pt) = C(p1) = C(pk(t)) and (p1,q1) is an element
of E(A(δ1
1), B(δ1
2)),w eh a v ef o ra l lk ∈ M:
ei(A + δ1
1R)q1  ek(A + δ1
1R)q1.
Because the rows of R are constant, we can rewrite this to be
ei Aq1 + δ1
1ri  ekAq1 + δ1
1rk, (1)IRE for bimatrix games 547
in which r ∈ Rm is any column of R. Similarly, for all k ∈ M:
ei Aqk(t) + δ
k(t)




ei Aˆ qt + εt
1ri  ekAˆ qt + εt
1rk, (3)
which boils down to
ei(A + εt
1R)ˆ qt  ek(A + εt
1R)ˆ qt (4)
for all k ∈ M. Hence, ˆ pt is a best response to ˆ qt with respect to the game (A +
εt
1R, B + εt
2S).    
BecauseIRE andstrictIRE coincide,Lemma1impliesthatonemightaswellonly
look at perturbations of the form (A(ε), B(ε)) = (A + εR, B + εS).
Corollary 1 (p,q) ∈ IRE(A, B) if and only if it is the limit of some trajectory
(pε,qε)ε↓0 with (pε,qε) ∈ E(A + εR, B + εS).
4 The structure of IRE
In bimatrix games, the set of Nash equilibria is the union of ﬁnitely many Nash
components(Jansen1981).Thissectionshowsthatthesetofinformationallyrobust
equilibriaofabimatrixgamecanbedividedintoaﬁnitesetofcomponentsaswell.
Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game. By deﬁnition, a set of strategy proﬁles G is called
an IRE component if
(i) G is a convex subset of IRE(A, B),
(ii) G is a product set, i.e., G = G1 × G2 for some G1 ⊆  m, G2 ⊆  n,
(iii) G is maximal with respect to properties (i) and (ii).
Replacing IRE(A, B) by E(A, B) yields the deﬁnition of a Nash component. To
getacquaintedwiththematerial,letusstartwithanexample.Itshowsthatdifferent
IRE components can be situated in the same Nash component.








Figure 2 provides the pure best reply ﬁgures. The left-hand side ﬁgure, i.e., the one
concerning player 1, displays the mixed strategy space of player 2, divided in three
parts. Their relative interiors are the areas in which the strategies of player 2 are
situated with unique best replies. Four boundary points have been given a name,
i.e., a = (2/3) f1 +(1/3) f2, b = (2/3) f1 +(1/3) f3, c = (2/3) f3 +(1/3) f1 and
d = (2/3) f3 + (1/3) f2. The right-hand side ﬁgure shows that e2 has three pure
best replies and all other (mixed) strategies of player 1 have f2 as their unique best
reply. Let (p,q) be a Nash equilibrium of (A, B).I fPB 2(B, p) ={f2},t h e nq548 H. Reijnierse et al.
Fig. 2 Pure best reply ﬁgures of player 1 (left) and player 2 (right)
can only be f2. The unique best reply on f2 is e2,b u tPB 2(B,e2) ={f1, f2, f3}.
Hence, PB 2(B, p) ={f1, f2, f3} and p equals e2. Therefore e2 must be a best
reply on q,s oq is situated in the convex hull of a, b, c, d and f2. We conclude that
the unique Nash component is {e2}× conv({a,b,c,d, f2}).
Let ε be a positive number close to zero. The perturbed game (A, B,ε)equals
⎡
⎣
(7 + 2ε,4 + 4ε) (2 + 2ε,5 + 3ε) (3 + 2ε,2 + 5ε)
(6 + 6ε,3 + 4ε) (4 + 6ε,3 + 3ε) (5 + 6ε,3 + 5ε)
(4 + 2ε,2 + 4ε) (2 + 2ε,6 + 3ε) (6 + 2ε,5 + 5ε)
⎤
⎦.
The pure best reply ﬁgures of the perturbed game are depicted in Figure 3.
It turns out that the point at which player 2 is indifferent between all his three
pure strategies has shifted slightly from e2 into the interior of the strategy space of
player 1. This leads to three areas with a unique pure best reply. Three boundary
points have been given a name, i.e., ˜ x = (1/2ε,1 − 1/2ε,0), ˜ y = (ε,1 − ε,0)
and ˜ z = (0,1 − 2ε,2ε). It is easy to infer that the perturbed game has three Nash
equilibria: (˜ x, ˜ b), converging to (e2,b); (˜ y, ˜ a), converging to (e2,a);a n d(˜ z, ˜ d),
converging to (e2,d).
In the example above, the IRE are all extreme points of the Nash component
of the game. The example in the introduction of this paper shows that not all Nash
Fig. 3 pure best reply ﬁgures of the perturbed game (A, B,ε)IRE for bimatrix games 549
components necessarily contain an IRE. The main result of this section is that for
every bimatrix game all IRE components are faces of a Nash component.
Theorem 3 Let(A, B)beabimatrixgame.ThenIRE(A, B)istheunionofﬁnitely
many IRE components, each of which is a face of a Nash component, and thereby
a polytope.
In the following proof the phrase “(p,q) is situated on the face F of polytope P”
denotes that (p,q) is an element of the relative interior of F. Note that for every
(p,q) ∈ P, there is exactly one face with this property.
Proof Theheartoftheproofconsistsofshowingthefollowingassertion.Let(p,q)
be an informationally robust equilibrium of the game (A, B).L e t(p ,q ) be situ-
ated on the same face of the same component of E(A, B) as (p,q).T h e n(p ,q )
is an element of IRE(A, B) as well. Once we have established to show the validity
of this assertion, the fact that IRE(A, B) is a closed set leads to the observation
that IRE components behave like Nash components, which completes the proof.
Hence, let us focus on the assertion above. Because a component is the carte-
sian product of two polytopes, (p ,q) is situated on the same face as (p,q) and
(p ,q ) are. We assume that q equals q , since if we can prove that (p ,q) ∈ IRE,
we can repeat the argument for (p ,q ), given that (p ,q) ∈ IRE. Inside the rela-
tive interior of the face of a Nash component the carrier C(·) and pure best reply
correspondence PB 2(B,·) are constant (see e.g. Jurg 1993, Sect. 2.2). Hence, we
have C(p) = C(p ) and PB 2(B, p) = PB 2(B, p ). Furthermore, since (p,q) ∈
IRE(A, B), there is a decreasing sequence (εt)t∈N with limit 0 and a series of
proﬁles (pt,qt)t∈N converging to (p,q) such that (pt,qt) is an equilibrium of the
game (A(εt), B(εt)).F o ra l lt,d e ﬁ n e
ˆ pt = p  − p + pt.
















and if ˆ pt
i < 0, then i ∈ C(p) = C(p ),s op 
i > 0. Hence, increasing t will
sufﬁcientlylead toapositivevalueof ˆ pt
i.Theproofis completewhen wecan show
that ( ˆ pt,qt) ∈ E(A(εt), B(εt)).W eh a v e
C( ˆ pt) ⊆ C(p ) ∪ C(p) ∪ C(pt) = C(pt) ⊆ PB 1(A(εt),qt),
so it remains to show that C(qt) ⊆ PB 2(B(εt), ˆ pt).L e tj ∈ C(qt) and   ∈
PB 2(B(εt), ˆ pt).S i n c eC(qt) ⊆ PB 2(B(εt), pt),w eh a v e
pt(B + εtS) f   pt(B + εtS) f j. (5)
Because pure best reply correspondences are upper semi-continuous (see Section
2), for t sufﬁciently large we obtain
C(qt) ⊆ PB 2(B(εt), pt) ⊆ PB 2(B, p) and PB 2(B(εt), ˆ pt) ⊆ PB 2(B, p ).550 H. Reijnierse et al.
Combining these statements gives
{j, }⊆PB 2(B, p) = PB 2(B, p ).
This implies that
pBf  = pBfj and − p Bf  =−p Bfj. (6)
Because the columns of S are constant, we have
p(εtS) f  = p (εtS) f  and p(εtS) f j = p (εtS) f j. (7)
Observations (5), (6) and (7) imply
(p − p  + pt)(B + εtS) f   (p − p  + pt)(B + εtS) f j.
Hence, like  , the strategy j is an element of PB 2(B(εt), ˆ pt). We conclude that
( ˆ pt,qt) is an element of E(A(εt), B(εt)).    
5 Potential games
Potential games have been introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). There are
manyeconomicsituationsthatcanbemodeledbypotentialgames.Foranoverview
we refer to Voorneveld (1999). The main virtue of having a potential function for a
ﬁnite game is that it implies the existence of an (easily traceable) Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies. Perhaps the most natural deﬁnition of a potential is the cardinal
(or exact) potential function. On the other hand, the ordinal potential generalizes
thisconcepttoamuchwiderclassofgamesandcanstillbeusedtoobtaintheresult
of this section. Therefore, we give the deﬁnition of the latter type of potential.
Deﬁnition 4 A bimatrix game (A, B) is an ordinal potential game if there exists
a function P :   −→ R such that for all p, p  ∈  m and q,q  ∈  n:
pAq > p Aq if and only if P(p,q)>P(p ,q), and
pBq > pBq  if andonlyif P(p,q)>P(p,q ).
The function P is called an (ordinal) potential of the game (A, B).
It turns out that IRE and the set of strategy pairs at which the potential is maximal
always have at least one proﬁle in common.
Theorem 4 Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game with ordinal potential P. Then there
exists a pure informationally robust equilibrium that maximizes the potential.
Proof Deﬁnethem×n-matrix ¯ P astherestrictionof P tothepurestrategyproﬁles
of (A, B):
¯ Pij = P(ei, f j). (i ∈ M, j ∈ N)IRE for bimatrix games 551
By deﬁnition of a potential, for all i,k ∈ M and all j, ∈ N:
Aij > Akj ⇐⇒ ¯ Pij > ¯ Pkj,
Bij > Bi  ⇐⇒ ¯ Pij > ¯ Pi . (8)
Let us call a matrix satisfying (8) a potential matrix of (A, B). Firstly, we show
that the perturbation (A+εR, B +εS) has potential matrix ¯ P +ε(R+S) if ε>0
is chosen sufﬁciently small. Leti,k ∈ M and j ∈ N.I fAij = Akj,t h e n ¯ Pij = ¯ Pkj
and therefore
(A + εR)ij >(A + εR)kj ⇐⇒ ( ¯ P + εR)ij >(¯ P + εR)kj. (9)
If Aij > Akj,t h e n ¯ Pij > ¯ Pkj and we can choose ε sufﬁciently small to obtain the
validity of the statements (A+εR)ij >(A+εR)kj and ( ¯ P +εR)ij >(¯ P +εR)kj
in (9). Similarly, (9) holds when Aij < Akj and ε is sufﬁciently small (switch the
roles of i and k).Because S has constant columns we have Sij = Skj,m a k i n g( 9 )
equivalent with
(A + εR)ij >(A + εR)kj ⇐⇒ ( ¯ P + εR + εS)ij >(¯ P + εR + εS)kj.
Similarly, for all i ∈ M and all j, ∈ N and sufﬁciently small ε:
(B + εS)ij >( B + εS)i  ⇐⇒ ( ¯ P + εR + εS)ij >(¯ P + εR + εS)i .
Hence, the perturbations have potential matrices as well. It is easy to infer that a
pure strategy proﬁle maximizing a potential matrix is a Nash equilibrium. There
are ﬁnitely many pure proﬁles, so for any sequence of perturbed games converging
to (A, B), there exists a subsequence of it and a pure proﬁle (ei, f j) such that
(ei, f j) is a “potential matrix maximizer” in all games in the subsequence. Since
the potential matrices of the perturbed games converge to ¯ P, (ei, f j) is a pure IRE
maximizing the potential P.    
Remark 1 Afunction P :   −→ Riscalledacardinalorexactpotentialof(A, B)
if for all p, p  ∈  m and all q,q  ∈  n we have
pAq− p Aq = P(p,q) − P(p ,q) and pBq− pBq  = P(p,q) − P(p,q ).
Inthecasethat P isacardinalpotential, P isthemultilinearextensionof ¯ P.Along
the lines of the proof of Theorem 4 it can be shown that the multilinear extension
of ( ¯ P +ε(R+ S)) is a cardinal potential of the perturbed game (A+εR, B +εS).
In general, not all potential maximizers survive. In the following cardinal po-
tentialgame,thesetofpotentialmaximizersistheunionoftwolinesegments.IRE
selects a single equilibrium.
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ItssetofNashequilibria E(A, B)isgivenby([e1,e2]×{f1}) ∪ ({e1}×[f1, f2]).
All equilibria maximize P. The perturbed game
(A(ε), B(ε)) =
 
(1 + 2ε,1 + 2ε) (2 + 2ε,1 + ε)
(1 + ε,2 + 2ε) (ε,ε)
 
has potential matrix
P + ε(R + S) =
 
1 + 4ε 1 + 3ε
1 + 3ε −1 + 2ε
 
.
Its only Nash equilibrium is (e1, f1).
6 Matrix games
Azero-sumormatrixgameisabimatrixgame(A, B)with B =−A andisdenoted
simply by A. Recall that in matrix games, the set of Nash equilibria has a product
structure, i.e., E(A) = O(A)1 × O(A)2,w h e r eO(A)1 are the optimal (maximin)
strategies of player 1 and O(A)2 are the optimal (minimax) strategies of player 2.
Since maximin/minimax strategies in combination yield the set of Nash equilib-
rium proﬁles, it makes sense to refer to elements of O(A)1 or O(A)2 separately
as equilibrium strategies. This section shows that also IRE(A) has such a product
structure. It is, like the Nash equilibrium set, a polytope and an element of it can
be found in polynomial time.
Let A beazero-sumgame.ByrecallingFigure1,itiseasytoseethatoutcomes
of perturbed games are convex combinations of outcomes of the original game,
so each perturbation is a zero-sum game as well. Hence, it sufﬁces to give the
perturbations of the payoff to player 1:
A(ε1,ε 2)ij = (1 − ε1 − ε2)Aij + ε1 min
 ∈N
Ai  + ε2 max
k∈M
Akj.
The matrix R becomes ((i, j) ∈ M × N),
Rij = max{Ai  |   ∈ PB 2(−A,ei)}=min
 ∈N
Ai .
Similarly, for i in M and j in N,





By Lemma 1, one might as well consider the perturbed game
(A + ε1R,−A + ε2S).
This game is best reply equivalent with the zero-sum game
A + ε1R − ε2S.IRE for bimatrix games 553
Finally, because IRE and strict IRE coincide, one might as well consider the per-
turbed game
A + ε(R − S).
Let r ∈ RM be any column of R (they are identical) and let s ∈ RN be any row of
S.
Theorem 5 Let A be a zero-sum game. Let O(A)1 and O(A)2 be the polytopes of
optimal strategies of players 1 and 2, respectively. Then IRE(A) is a product set,
i.e., it can be decomposed: IRE(A) = IO(A)1 × IO(A)2.IO (A)1 is the face of
O(A)1 at which the linear function
O(A)1 −→ R, p  → p,r 
is maximized. Similarly, IO(A)2 is the face of O(A)2 at which the linear function
O(A)2 −→ R, q  →  − s,q 
is minimized.
The proof is based on the following idea. We have seen that IRE(A) ⊆ E(A).I t




the proof has been postponed to the appendix. It requires acquaintance with the
Simplex method (e.g. Nemhauser and Wolsey 1988).
The nature of zero-sum games supports the reﬁnement of informationally
robustness. For instance, it reduces the harm “not having a poker face” can have,
or the disutility that occurs if it is possible to be “cheaten” with small probabilities.
Let us give as an illustration a situation in which IRE selects in our opinion the
proﬁle that ﬁts best with the context.
Example 4 Consider a situation in which a penalty shot has been assigned to a
soccer team. Let us give the forward taking the penalty three options: aim at the
left corner, the right corner, or just give a ﬁrm kick. If the forward is skilled, it is
obvious that the best thing to do is aim at a corner. If his aiming is poor, however,
andhefacesanexcellentkeeper,hewouldbettershootﬁrmlyandhopeforthebest.
The keeper has three pure strategies as well: dive to the left (from the perspective
oftheforward),divetotheright,orstandstillandreactontheshot.Inourexample,
depictedinFigure4,theforwardismoderateandwehavedesignedtheﬁguressuch
that he has various optimal strategies. Because the forward cannot aim perfectly,
the ﬁgures in the matrix do not represent certain outcomes, but expectations.
Thekeeperhasoneoptimalstrategy:q = (1/2)( f1+ f2).Theforwardhastwo
extreme optimal strategies: p1 = (1/2)(e1 + e2) and p2 = (1/6)(e1 + e2 + 4e3).
Which one is better? In spite of the fact that p2 is weakly dominated by p1,t h e
concept of IRE recommends p2. In the spirit of the concept, p2 should be played
according to the following lines of thought of the forward:554 H. Reijnierse et al.
Fig. 4 A penalty shot
Suppose the keeper can see which corner I am aiming at. Then my chances
reduce. On the other hand, if the keeper can see I go for the ﬁrm kick, this
information is of less value to him.
By using Theorem 5, it is easy to infer that (p2,q) is, indeed, the only informa-
tionally robust equilibrium; any row r of R equals (−1,−1,−1/2) and −1 =
 r, p1  <  r, p2 =− 2/3.
7 Concluding remarks and future work
Informationally robust equilibria reﬁne Nash equilibria by introducing small prob-
abilities of information leakage. This ﬁnal section contains brief discussions of the
possibilities to generalize information robustness to settings with inﬁnite strategy
spaces and more than two players.
Extending the deﬁnition of perturbed games to settings with inﬁnite strategy
spaces can be done as follows. Assume that player i = 1,2 has a set Si of pure
strategies which is a non-empty and compact subset of some ﬁnite-dimensional
Euclidean space, and that his utility function ui : S1 × S2 → R is continuous.
With probability ε1, ﬁrst player’s action s1 ∈ S1 is revealed to player two, who
will choose a best reply from PB 2(s1) = argmaxs2∈S2 u2(s1,s2), a non-empty and
compact set. Breaking ties by selecting a best reply that maximizes ﬁrst player’s
utility means choosing an element solving maxs2∈PB 2(s1) u1(s1,s2), which has a
well-deﬁnedsolution,sinceu1 iscontinuousand PB 2(s1)non-emptyandcompact.
Hence, the deﬁnition of a perturbed game easily translates to cases with inﬁnite
strategy spaces. However, there are relatively simple examples showing that the
perturbed utility functions are not continuous. The choice of the tie breaking rule,
however, guarantees equilibrium existence in these perturbations (see e.g. Hellwig
et al. 1990).
Extendinginformationrobustnesstogameswithmorethantwoplayersrequires
careful modeling of the timing and content of information leakage. We give three
suggestions:
(i) Each player, but at most one at a time, hears with a small possibility the strat-
egies of all of his opponents. The player can best reply to this observation.
(ii) Each player, but at most one at a time, reveals with a small possibility his
strategy to all of his opponents. The others play an (n − 1)-person game
thereafter.IRE for bimatrix games 555
(iii) For each ordered pair of players (i, j), there is a slight chance that i ﬁnds out




In order to prove Theorem 5, a result is needed from Linear Algebra, providing
sufﬁcientconditionsforconvergenceofsolutionsetsofperturbedsystemsoflinear
equations.
Claim Let D be an m ×n-matrix and let (dt)t∈N be a sequence in Rm converging
to d.L e tf o ra l lt in N, Ft ⊂ Rn be the set of feasible points of the system of
equations {x ∈ Rn
+ | Dx = dt}.L e tF be the set of feasible points of {x ∈ Rn
+ |
Dx = d}. Suppose there exists a uniform bound M ∈ N, i.e.,  x   M for all
x ∈
 
Ft. If all solution sets Ft are non-empty, then Ft converges to F in the
sense that
(i) if ˆ xt ∈ Ft for all t ∈ N and lim
t→∞
ˆ xt =ˆ x,t h e nˆ x ∈ F,
(ii) for all ˆ x ∈ F there exists a sequence (ˆ xt)t∈N in (Ft)t∈N converging to ˆ x.
Proof It is easy to infer statement (i) by a continuity argument. The difﬁcult part
is to show that any element of F is the limit of some sequence in (Ft)t∈N.T h e
proof will be by induction to n; the number of columns. The case n = 1i sl e f tt o
the reader. We distinguish between two cases.
Case I: There exists a strictly positive element s ∈ Rn
++ of F.
Linear operations like adding rows to others, or multiplying a row with a non-
zero number will not change the solutions sets, nor the feature that the constraint




¯ 0 ¯ 0
 
,
in which r is the rank of D, Ir is an identity matrix, M is some matrix with r rows
and n − r columns and the zeros represent zero matrices. Because Ft  =∅for all
t ∈ N,w eh a v et h a tdi = dt
i = 0f o ra l lt ∈ N and all i > r. Hence, we might as
well remove the m −r zero-rows of D, which boils down to assuming that D is of
full rank: r = m.L e tq = (d1,...,dm,0,...,0) ∈ Rn.T h e nDq = d. Similarly,
let qt = (dt, ¯ 0) ∈ Rn,s oDqt = dt.D e ﬁ n est = s + qt − q.L e tδ>0b es u c h
that si >δfor all i  n.T h e nst
i >( 1/2)δ for large t and i  n.
Let ˆ x be any element of F.D e ﬁ n eˆ xt =ˆ x + qt − q.T h e nDˆ xt = dt and
ˆ xt −→ ˆ x.L e tλt = min{λ ∈[ 0,1]|λst + (1 − λ)ˆ xt  ¯ 0} and deﬁne ˜ xt =
λtst + (1 − λt)ˆ xt ∈ Ft.L e tε>0. Choose t so large that ˆ xt
i > −ε for all i.I f
ˆ xt / ∈ Rn
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Since δ is ﬁxed and ε can be chosen to be as small as desired, λt tends to 0. Hence,
 ˆ x −˜ xt  converges to 0 if t tends to ∞. This ends Case I.
Case II: For some i  n, xi = 0 for all x ∈ F.
Without loss of generality, choose i = n.L e tδt = minx∈Ft xn.L e tδ be
an accumulation point of (δt)t∈N. Because of the uniform bound M, there exists a
sequencext1,xt2,xt3,...convergingto,say,x withx
tk
n = δtk andlimk→∞ δtk = δ.
By continuity, x ∈ F and limk→∞ δtk = xn = 0. Hence, 0 is the only accumu-
lation point; limt→∞ δt = 0. Substitute, for all t ∈ N, xn = δt in the equation
set Dx = dt. The solution sets may become smaller, but remain non-empty. By
now, the right column can be removed from all sets of equations and we obtain
a setting with one-dimension less. Hence, we can apply the induction hypothe-
sis. For an arbitrary element ˆ x = (ˆ x1,...,ˆ xn−1,0) of F, we can give an element
(ˆ xt
1,...,ˆ xt
n−1,δt) in Ft close to ˆ x.s    
Notice that if the constraint matrix D is perturbed as well, convergence is not




t 1 + 1
t
1 + 1









the solution sets of Ft all equal {(1,1)}, while the solution set of F equals {(x,
2 − x) : x ∈[ 0,2]}.
Proof of Theorem 5 Because for every ε>0, E(A + ε(R − S)) is a product set
and a polytope and because IRE(A) coincides with strict IRE(A) (Theorem 2),
IRE(A)isaproductsetandapolytopeaswell,sayIRE(A) = IO(A)1×IO(A)2 ⊆
 m ×  n. The assertions concerning IO(A)1 and IO(A)2 are so similar that we
sufﬁce with the proof of the latter. Assume without loss of generality that A > 0.
Then R is as well a strictly positive matrix and S is a strictly negative matrix.
Furthermore, v(A), the value of the game, is strictly positive. Let (εt)t∈N be a
decreasing sequence with limit 0. O(A + εt(R − S))2 is the set of optimal solu-
tions of the linear program
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The left column will be referred to as column v, the top row as row 0 and each
other row by its corresponding pure strategy: row i (i ∈ M). If we would like to
apply the Simplex method, for each row a slack variable has to be added, except
for row 0, since
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Here, ev denotes the unit vector of R × RN × RM corresponding to v and Im
denotes the m ×m identity matrix. By adding row 0 of the table εtri times to row i
(i ∈ M), the table becomes independent of the matrix R, except for the constraint
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Denote the constraint matrix in the program LPt by Dt. The program and con-
straintmatrixobtainedbysubstitutingεt = 0willbecalled LPand D,respectively.
Theycorrespondtothenon-perturbedgame A.AfterhavingperformedtheSimplex








  = bt. (11)
Let us recall the features of the Simplex method that are important for our purpose.
The ﬁnal object vector at ∈ R+×RN
+ ×RM
+ is non-negative and equals the sum of
the original object vector ev and some linear combination of the rows of LPt.T h e
main principle of the Simplex method is, that one might as well optimize the ﬁnal
object vector, because for any row Dt
i·, the inner product  Dt
i·,x  is independent
on x (as long as x is chosen feasible). The set of optimal points consists of all
feasible points with inner product zero with the ﬁnal object vector. Because the
tables consists of linear equations, we can normalize them such that for all t ∈ N,
all numbers in Bt, bt and at are in some compact segment, e.g., [−1,1]. Hence, by
taking a suitable subsequence of the sequence (εt)t∈N, we can accomplish that Bt,
bt and at converge to, say, B, b and a, respectively. This limit (minimize  a,x  s.t.
Bx = b) is a table for the original game and could have been obtained by applying
the Simplex method on LP. Hence, a equals ev plus some linear combination of
the rows of LP:
a = ev +
m  
i=0
ciDi· for some c ∈ R × RM. (12)
Because v(A) is strictly positive, we have that xv = v(A)>0 for all optimal
points, so av = 0. Focussing at the ﬁrst column of LP, equation (12) gives
0 = av = (ev)v +
m  
i=0




We have that at
i > 0f o rl a r g et and all i ∈ C(a). Hence, all variables correspond-
i n gt oe l e m e n t so fC(a) have value 0 in any optimal point and all corresponding
columns can be removed3 from the tables LPt and LPwithout changing optimal
sets: columns in C(a) ∩ M correspond to pure strategies on which player 1 can
2 The  denotes that the vector is transposed.
3 The removed variables of course still have to be stored and are set to be zero.558 H. Reijnierse et al.
put some weight while playing optimal in the original game A and columns in
C(a) ∩ N correspond to pure strategies on which player 2 does not put positive
weight in any equilibriumof A. Denote the complement of the carrier ofa by Z(a)
(the ‘zero part’ of a):
Z(a) ={ i : ai = 0}.
Denote the matrices Dt and D of which the redundant columns have been deleted
by ¯ Dt and ¯ D, respectively. Similarly, let ¯ ev = (1,0,...,0) ∈ RZ(a) be the ﬁrst
unit vector of RZ(a),l e t¯ s ∈ RZ(a) be the restriction of the vector (0,s,0,...,0) ∈
R×RN ×RM and let ¯ at be the restriction of at (so ¯ at = ¯ 0f o ra l lt). We can omit
these columns as well in equation (12):













  ¯ Dt





ciεt¯ s = (−1) · εt¯ s.
Toinferthesecondequality,considerprogram LPt,(equation(10)):thedifference
between row i of LPt and row i of LPis εt times the vector (0,s,0,...,0) for
all i  1. For the third equality we refer to (13). Hence, for all t ∈ N, instead
of minimizing  ¯ ev,x , we might as well minimize  −εt¯ s,x ,o r −¯ s,x .C a l lt h e
alternative optimization problem ALPt:








Letusrepeattheresultssofar.Forallt ∈ N,thesetO(A+εt(R−S))2 isdescribed
by ALPt in the sense that for all q ∈  n, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) q ∈ O(A + εt(R − S))2 and
(ii) qj = 0f o ra l lj ∈ N ∩ C(a) and qj = x j for all j ∈ N ∩ Z(a) and some
optimal solution x ∈ R
Z(a)
+ of ALPt.
Consequently, the program obtained by substituting εt = 0i nALPt will be called
ALP. The set of feasible points of ALP corresponds to O(A)2 in the sense that
for all q ∈  n: q ∈ O(A)2 if and only if qj = 0f o ra l lj ∈ N ∩C(a) and qj = x j
for all j ∈ N ∩ Z(a) and some feasible point x ∈ R
Z(a)
+ of ALP. The optimal
set of ALP corresponds to the face of O(A)2 of which Theorem 5 claims that it
coincides with IO(A)2. Hence, we are done if we can show that the optimal set of
ALPt converges to the optimal set of ALP.
After having performed the Simplex method on table ALPt, we get again a
table of the form
minimize  ht,x  s.t.
x0
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Here, ht ∈ R
Z(a)
+ . The following lines of argumentation copy the one just after
equation (11), so details are omitted. Assume that ht converges to h.T h e n
h =−¯ s +
m  
i=0
¯ ci ¯ Di· for some ¯ c ∈ R × RM. (14)
We have that ht
i > 0f o rl a r g et and all i ∈ C(h). Columns corresponding to
elements of C(h) are removed from the tables ALPt and ALP without changing
optimal sets. Denote the matrices ¯ Dt and ¯ D of which the redundant columns have
been deleted by ˆ Dt and ˆ D, respectively. Similarly, let ˆ ev ∈ RZ(h) be the ﬁrst unit
vector of RZ(h),l e tˆ s ∈ RZ(h) be the restriction of ¯ s. Omit the redundant columns
in equation (14):
¯ 0 =− ˆ s +
m  
i=0
¯ ci ˆ Di·








¯ ci( ˆ Dt




Theobjectvector−ˆ s manifeststobealinearcombinationoftherowsof ˆ Dt.Hence,
the linear function  −ˆ s,·  is constant on the polytope Ft ={ x ∈ R
Z(h)
+ | ˆ Dtx =  
1,εtr
 },s a ykt =  − ˆ s,x  for all x ∈ Ft.A d dt oa l lr o w so fALPt but the ﬁrst,






   
  ˆ Dx =[ 1,εt(r1 + kt),...,εt(rm + kt)]
 
.
Observe that the constraint matrix of this description is no longer dependent on t.
Conclusion: we have found a description of the form ( ˆ Dx = dt, x  0) of the
optimal set of ALPt and a description ( ˆ Dx = (1,0,...,0), x  0) of the optimal
set of ALP. Apply Claim 7 and conclude the validity of Theorem 5.    
References
Bagwell, K.: Commitment and observability in games. Games Econ Behav 8, 271–280 (1995)
Hellwig, M., Leininger, W., Reny, P., Robson, A.: Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous
games of perfect information: an elementary approach to existence and approximation by
discrete games. J Econ Theor 52, 406–422 (1990)
Jansen, M.: Maximal nash subsets for bimatrix games. Naval Res Logist Q 28, 85–101 (1981)
Jurg, A.: Some topics in the theory of bimatrix games. Ph. D. thesis, University of Nijmegen
(1993)
Kohlberg, E., Mertens, J.F.: On strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1003–1037
(1986)
Matsui, A.: Information leakage forces cooperation. Games Econ Behav 1, 94–115 (1989)
Monderer, D., Shapley, L.: Potential games. Games Econ Behav 14, 124–143 (1996)
Myerson, R.B.: Reﬁnements of the nash equilibrium point concept. Int J Game Theor 7, 73–80
(1978)560 H. Reijnierse et al.
Nemhauser, G., Wolsey, L.: Integer and combinatorial optimization. New York: Wiley 1988
Okada, A.: Strictly perfect equilibrium points in strategic games. Int J Game Theor 13, 145–154
(1984)
Reny, P., Robson, A.: Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a uniﬁcation of the classical and
baysian views. Games Econ Behav 48, 355–384 (2004)
Robson, A.: An ‘informationallyrobustequilibrium’for two-personnonzerosum games. Games
Econ Behav 7, 233–245 (1994)
Selten, R.: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.
Int J Game Theor 4, 25–55 (1975)
Solan, E., Yariv, L.: Games with espionage. Games Econ Behav 47, 172–199 (2004)
Van Damme, E.: Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria. Berlin Heidelberg New York:
Springer 1991
Voorneveld, M.: Potential games and interactive decisions with multiple criteria. Ph. D. thesis,
Tilburg University, Center dissertation series (1999)